Abstract. We present an extension of Wiener's attack on small RSA secret decryption exponents [10] . Wiener showed that every RSA public key tuple (N, e) with e ∈ * φ(N) that satisfies ed − 1 = 0 mod φ(N ) for some d < In other words, the generalization works for all secret keys d = −xy −1 , where x, y are suitably small. We show that the number of these weak keys is at least N 3 4 −ǫ and that the number increases with decreasing prime difference p − q. As an application of our new attack, we present the cryptanalysis of an RSA-type scheme presented by Yen, Kim, Lim and Moon [11, 12] . Our results point out again the warning for cryptodesigners to be careful when using the RSA key generation process with special parameters.
Introduction
Let N = pq be an RSA-modulus, where p and q are primes of equal bit-size (wlog p > q). Let e be the public exponent and d be the secret exponent satisfying ed = 1 mod φ(N ), where φ(N ) is the Euler totient function. We denote by * φ(N ) the multiplicative group of invertible integers modulo φ(N ). An RSA public key is a tuple (N, e) ∈ × designed to counteract the fault-based attack on CRT-RSA of Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton [2] . In 1990, Wiener [10] observed that information encoded in the public exponent e might help to factor N . More precisely, he showed that every public exponent e ∈ * φ(N ) that corresponds to a secret exponent d with d ≤ 1 3 N 1 4 yields the factorization of the modulus in time polynomial in log(N ). In 1999, Boneh and Durfee [3] used Coppersmith's method for finding small roots of modular polynomial equations [4] to improve the bound to d ≤ N 0.292 . Although the YKLM-scheme uses a special key generation algorithm in order to provide good performance, the secret keys d are not chosen to be small. Therefore, the Wiener attack as well as the Boneh-Durfee attack cannot directly be applied to this RSA-variant. However, in this work we present an extension of Wiener's approach that leeds to a much larger class of secret keys d which are insecure. Furthermore, we show that the keys which are generated in the YKLMscheme belong to this larger class, for all reasonable parameter choices of the scheme. As a result, we obtain that the public keys (N, e) in the YKLM-scheme yield the factorization of N in polynomial time.
Let us put the cryptanalytic approaches above into a more general framework by defining the notion of weak keys: The results so far show that there are classes of public keys (N, e) where every element in the class yields the factorization of N . One may view the auxiliary input e as a hint how to factor N : Without having e we assume that factoring N is hard, but with the help of e it becomes feasible. In the case of the Wiener attack the class consists of all public key tuples (N, e) where ed − 1 = 0 mod φ(N ) with d < . We call such a class weak and the elements (N, e) of the weak class are called weak keys. To be more precisely: We define the size of a class of public key tuples by the number of elements (N, e) in the class for every fixed N . Let C be a class of public key tuples (N, e), then size C (N ) = |{e ∈ * φ(N ) | (N, e) ∈ C}|.
C is called weak if 1. The size of C is polynomial in N , i.e. size C (N ) = Ω(N γ ) for some γ > 0. 2. There exists a probabilistic algorithm A that on every input (N, e) ∈ C outputs the factorization of N in time polynomial in log(N ).
Note that the size of a weak class is a function in N which denotes the number of elements that can be factored by the corresponding algorithm A. For example, the size of the class in the Wiener attack is at least N 1 4 −ǫ . Here the ǫ-term comes from the fact that only those d with gcd(d, φ(N )) = 1 define legitimate RSA-keys.
Let us give another (trivial) example of a weak class of public keys. Every tuple (N, e) with e = kq, 1 < k < p is a weak key, since the computation gcd(N, e) = q yields the factorization. These are p > N 1 2 many weak keys. Howgrave-Graham [6] observed that even the knowledge of e = kq + r for some unknown r ≤ N 1 4 suffices to find the factorization of N . This implies the existence of a weak class with size N 3 4 . We think that it is a very natural question to study how many of the possible choices of the public keys are indeed weak keys that should not be used in the design of crypto-systems. For the Wiener attack and the Boneh-Durfee attack it is easy for a crypto-designer to see that a key is weak by inspecting the most significant bits of d. For the extension of Wiener's attack that we describe in this paper the weakness of the keys is not obvious. One can understand our new result as a warning for crypto-designers to be careful when using keys with a special structure.
There is also an imminent danger from weak keys in the case of untrusted servers that create public/secret key pairs: Crépeau and Slakmon [5] showed how to use weak keys in order to construct malicious RSA systems by encoding information into the public exponent e. Our new class of weak keys is well-suited for the use in such systems and leads to a large variety of new malicious keys.
In order to describe our new attack, let us first consider the normal RSAcase, where p − q = Ω( √ N ). Note that for randomly chosen primes of the same bitsize, the probability that p, q agree in the c most significant bits is roughly 2 −(c−1) . Hence, we have p − q = Ω( √ N ) with overwhelming probability. For the case p − q = Ω( √ N ), we introduce a variant of Wiener's attack that works for all public keys (N, e) where ex + y = kφ(N ), k ∈ AE with
and
Notice that our bounds exclude trivial solutions where ex+ y = 0, since |y| < ex.
The new method works as follows: As in Wiener's approach, we use the continued fraction algorithm to recover the unknown values x and k. Afterwards, we show that a factorization method due to Coppersmith [4] can be applied: Given half of the most significant bits of p, one can find the factorization of N .
Let us compare the new result to Wiener's attack. Our weak keys have the structure that e −1 = d = − as in Wiener's attack, the parameter e must be of size at least N 3 4 in order to satisfy a relation of the form ex + y = 0 mod φ(N ). Thus, |y| can be chosen of size at least x. If e is roughly N , which is normally the case for small d, |y| can even be chosen of size N 1 4 x in the attack. One should expect that for fixed N the number of public keys (N, e) for which our approach applies is roughly the number of tuples (x, y) within the given bounds. This number can be upper bounded by x · N . In fact, we are able to show that the number of weak keys (N, e) for which our algorithm works is also lower bounded by Ω(N 3 4 −ǫ ). It is important to notice that in contrast to the approaches of Wiener and Boneh-Durfee, the secret keys in our attack are not small itself but have a "small decomposition" in x and y. So they might look innocuous to crypto-designers and may be tempting to use in the design of cryto-systems with good encryption/decryption performance.
As an example, we show that the public keys (N, e) constructed in the YKLM-scheme can be attacked by our generalization of Wiener's method. Namely, we can express the secret exponent d in terms of small x and y, which breaks the crypto-system for all reasonable parameter choices.
In 2002, de Weger [9] observed that Wiener's attack can be improved when the prime difference p − q is significantly less than √ N . de Weger's method also applies to our extension of Wiener's attack. Interestingly, we are able to show that for prime difference p − q = N It is important to notice that for prime difference p−q = O(N 1 4 ) an algorithm of Fermat finds the factorization in polynomial time. Thus, our attack has a nice interpolation property towards Fermat's algorithm: As p − q decreases, the number of weak public keys increases. For γ approaching zero almost all keys are weak, corresponding to the fact that N can be easily factored without any hint that is encoded in e.
As a by-product, we get a simple probabilistic factorization algorithm with expected running time O(N γ+ǫ ) comparable to Fermat-Factorization: For a fixed N , choose random e < N and apply our algorithm to each choice (N, e) until (N, e) is a weak key that yields the factorization.
Notice that the interpolation property above seems to imply that one cannot improve our approach significantly. On the other hand, there might be different techniques -for example lattice reduction techniques for higher dimensional lattices -that lead to larger classes of weak keys for the prime difference p − q = Ω( √ N ). But at the moment this is an open question. The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present our extension of Wiener's attack. As an application of this method, we present the crytanalysis of the YKLM-scheme in Section 3. In Section 4, we apply the methods of de Weger to our generalized Wiener attack. We conclude the paper by showing in Section 5 that the number of weak RSA-keys (N, e) in our approach is Ω(N 3 4 −ǫ ).
The generalized Wiener attack
Throughout this work we consider RSA-moduli N = pq, where p and q are of the same bit-size (wlog p > q). This implies the inequalities
Our attack makes use of a well-known result due to Coppersmith [4] : Theorem 1 (Coppersmith) Let N = pq be an RSA-modulus, where p and q are of the same bit-size. Suppose we are given an approximation of p with additive error at most N 4 . Then N can be factored in time polynomial in log N .
We are now able to state our main theorem. Here we consider the normal RSAcase where
Theorem 2 Let c ≤ 1 and let (N, e) be an RSA public key tuple with N = pq and p − q ≥ cN and |y| ≤ cN
Then N can be factored in polynomial time.
One should notice that the conditions of Theorem 2 imply that ex + y = 0, thereby excluding trivial congruences: Since c ≤ 1, we see that |y| < ex. This in turn implies k > 0.
Roadmap for the Proof of Theorem 2 -We show that the unknown parameters x, k can be found among the convergents of the continued fraction expansion of e N .
-From x and k, we compute an approximation of p + q.
-From an approximation of p + q, we compute an approximation of p − q.
-Combining both approximations gives us an approximation of p, which leads to the factorization of N by using Coppersmith's Theorem.
We want to argue that in the following proof we can assume wlog that N ≥ ( Proof: Let us start with the RSA key equation
Dividing by N x gives us
We want to argue that we can assume wlog that gcd(k, x) = 1. Notice that every integer that divides both k and x must also divide y by equation (1) . Thus, we can divide equation (1) by gcd(k, x) which gives us an equation ex ′ +y ′ = 0 mod φ(N ) with even smaller parameters x ′ and y ′ . Hence we can assume that k x is a fraction in its lowest terms.
By a well-known theorem (see e.g. Theorem 184 in [7] ), the fraction ex. Therefore, we obtain 3 4
Now we are able to estimate
where the last inequality holds for N ≥ 2 12 . Therefore, we have to satisfy the condition 4xN . Hence, the fraction k x must be among the convergents of the continued fraction expansion of e N . Since there are only O(log N ) many convergents, we can apply the following process to each candidate for k and x until our algorithm succeeds.
We have to show that the correct k and x yield the factorization of N . Let us write equation (1) as
Since every parameter on the left hand side is now known to us, we can compute an approximation of p+q up to some unknown error term Our goal is to find an approximation of p up to some error of size N 1 4 in order to apply Coppersmith's theorem. Therefore, we transform our approximation of p + q into an approximation of p − q using the relation
Let s be our approximation of p + q with additive error at most . We will show that t = √ s 2 − 4N is an approximation of p − q with an additive error that can be bounded by 9N It remains to show that t = √ s 2 − 4N is indeed an approximation of p − q up to some error term that can be bounded by 9N 
Therefore, it suffices to show that |2 
We observe that
Using the inequalities (3), s − (p + q) ≤ 
Cryptanalysis of the YKLM-scheme
In 2001, Yen, Kim, Lim and Moon [11, 12] presented an RSA-type scheme that was designed to counteract the Bellcore-attack (see [2] ). Unfortunately, they need a specialized RSA key generation process in order to make their scheme efficient. Their public key e satisfies a relation with some small parameters that will be described in this section. The efficiency of the YKLM-scheme relies on the fact that these parameters are indeed much smaller than the modulus N . It was raised as an open question by the authors if one can use random public keys e as well in their scheme, thereby maintaining the same performance.
We show that the public keys constructed in the YKLM-scheme satisfy the conditions of Theorem 2, i.e. for every public exponent e we have ex + y = 0 mod φ(N ) with small x and y.
Let us first reconsider the modified key generation algorithm in the YKLMscheme.
RSA Key Generation in the YKLM-scheme
Modulus : Choose randomly two primes p and q of the same bit-size and compute the product N = pq. The authors pointed out that instead of the public key tuple (N, e) one could even publish the parameters e r and r as well, but the following observation shows that the parameters e r and r immediately yield the factorization of N .
Consider the public key equation
The secret key d has a decomposition into the unknown part d r and the known parameter r e(d r + r) − 1 = 0 mod φ(N ).
Multiplication with e r removes the unknown parameter d r e(1 + e r r) − e r = 0 mod φ(N ).
Since every parameter on the left hand side is known, we can compute a multiple kφ(N ) of the Euler function e(1 + e r r) − e r = kφ(N ) for some k ∈ AE.
Since e < φ(N ), we have that k < (1 + e r r). Therefore, the bit-length of k is polynomial in the bit-length of N . It is a well-known result that such a multiple kφ(N ) yields the factorization of N in probabilistic polynomial time in the bitlength of N (see for example [8] ). Certainly, there is no need to publish the small parameters e r and r in the YKLM-scheme. On the other hand, we see that by equation (4) one can apply Theorem 2 by setting x = 1 + e r r and y = −e r . This gives us the following corollary from Theorem 2.
Corollary 3 Let c ≤ 1 and let (N, e) be a public key tuple constructed by the key generation process in the YKLM-scheme with p − q ≥ cN Then N can be factored in time polynomial in log(N ).
Proof: In order to be able to apply Theorem 2, it remains to show that Since the efficiency of the YKLM-scheme relies on the fact that e r and r are very small compared to N , Corollary 3 breaks the YKLM-scheme for all reasonable parameter choices.
4 Generalizing to arbitrary prime differences p − q de Weger [10] observed that Wiener's attack can be improved when p−q is significantly smaller than √ N . He showed that N ′ = N − ⌊2 √ N ⌋ is an approximation of φ(N ) with error at most · ex.
Then N can be factored in time polynomial in log N .
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2. One mainly substitutes N by N ′ = N − ⌊2 √ N ⌋ and works through the arithmetic. Therefore we omit the proof.
Instead we give the factorization algorithm. In Section 4, we showed that every public key tuple (N, e) that satisfies a relation ex + y = 0 mod φ(N ), with
yields the factorization of N in polynomial time. Those tuples (N, e) are weak keys that should not be used in the design of a crypto-system. Let us formalize the notion of weak keys.
Definition 5 Let C be a class of RSA public keys (N, e). The size of the class C is defined by size C (N ) = |{e ∈ * φ(N ) | (N, e) ∈ C}|. C is called weak if:
There exists a probabilistic algorithm A that on every input (N, e) ∈ C outputs the factorization of N in time polynomial in log(N ).
The elements of a weak class are called weak keys.
Our variant of Wiener's attack in Section 4 defines a weak class C. The question we will study in this chapter is, how large this weak class is. What bounds can we expect for size C (N )? As a first estimate we can sum over all tuples (x, y) within the bounds given by the inequalities in (5). This gives us an upper bound on the size of C. Therefore, we have at most
weak keys. This is an upper bound on size C (N ) since:
-Different tuples (x, y) might define the same public exponent e.
-Some of the tuples (x, y) do not even define a legitimate public key e, e.g. a key e ∈ Z * φ(N ) .
Instead of an upper bound on size C (N ), we are interested in a lower bound. Namely, we want to know the minimal number of public exponents e ∈ * φ(N )
that yield the factorization for some fixed modulus N . In this section we will prove a lower bound for size C (N ).
As the result we obtain that our lower bound almost perfectly matches the upper bound: If p − q = Ω(N is Ω(N 1−γ−ǫ ). That means that the number of weak keys scales almost perfectly with the prime difference p − q. As p − q decreases, the number of weak key tuples increases and as γ approaches zero almost all keys are weak. This corresponds to the fact that for γ = 0, all tuples (N, e) are weak because one can find the factorization of N in polynomial time with Fermat's algorithm.
We will now prove the lower bound result, where we use the following main lemma.
Lemma 6 Let f (N, e), g(N, e) be functions such that f 2 (N, e)g(N, e) < φ(N ), f (N, e) ≥ 2 and g(N, e) ≤ f (N, e). The number of public keys e ∈ * φ(N ) , e ≥ φ(N ) 4
that satisfy an equation ex + y = 0 mod φ(N ) for x ≤ f (N, e) and |y| ≤ g(N, e)x is at least
where ǫ > 0 is arbitrarily small for N suitably large.
Using Lemma 6, we can immediately prove our lower bound theorem. .
It can be easily checked that these settings fulfill the requirements of Lemma 6:
Hence, we can apply Lemma 6. Since g(N, e) = Ω(N γ ), the term
Using f 2 (N, e)g(N, e) = Ω( We obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 8 Let C be the weak class that is given by the public key tuples (N, e) defined in Theorem 2 with the additional restriction that e ∈ * φ(N ) , e ≥ φ(N ) 4 . Then
log log 2 (N 2 ) .
It remains to prove Lemma 6. Since the proof is technical, we describe just the rough idea and leave the details to the appendix.
As denoted before, different tuples (x, y) might define the same public exponent e and some tuples (x, y) do not define a legitimate key e ∈ Z * φ(N ) . Therefore, we define a suitably large subclass T of all tuples (x, y) within the given bounds x ≤ f (N, e) and |y| ≤ g(N, e)x such that different tuples define different legitimate keys e.
The definition of the class T and the details of the proof can be found in the appendix.
Let us define the sets T (k) and their union T .
Definition 9
For every fixed N and for every k ∈ define the set
gcd(x, kφ(N )) = 1, gcd(y, φ(N )) = 1 .
Further define
The rest of the proof of Lemma 6 is dedicated to the verification of the three properties stated in the roadmap above.
The following lemma shows that each tuple (x, y) ∈ T (k) defines a public exponent e ∈ Z * φ(N ) of the desired form.
Lemma 10 For every tuple (x, y) ∈ T (k) there is an e ∈ Z * φ(N ) such that ex + y = kφ(N ).
Proof: Since y = kφ(N ) mod x by Definition 9, there exists an integer e such that ex + y = kφ(N ).
Using 0 < k < x and |y| ≤ gx < gf 2 < φ(N ), we obtain
Finally since gcd(y, φ(N )), we have gcd(ex, φ(N )) = gcd(kφ(N ) − y, φ(N )) = 1, and therefore gcd(e, φ(N )) = 1 which concludes the proof.
Next we want to show that different tuples (x, y) lead to different public keys.
Lemma 11
Let (x 0 , y 0 ) and (x 1 , y 1 ) be two different tuples from T . Then they define distinct public exponents.
Proof: According to Lemma 10, there exist e 0 , e 1 ∈ * φ(N ) such that e 0 x 0 +y 0 = 0 mod φ(N ) and e 1 x 1 +y 1 = 0 mod φ(N ). Assume for contradiction that e 0 = e 1 . This implies y 0 x 0 = y 1 x 1 mod φ(N ).
Note that the fractions are well-defined since gcd(x 0 , φ(N )) = 1 and gcd(x 1 , φ(N )) = 1 by Definition 9.
Equivalently we can write y 0 x 1 = y 1 x 0 mod φ(N ).
But x 0 , x 1 ≤ f and y 0 , y 1 ≤ g. This implies that both products in the identity above are smaller than f g <
in absolute value. Thus, the identity even holds over the integers and not just modulo φ(N ).
By Definition 9, all the tuples (x, y) ∈ T (k) satisfy the relations y = kφ(N ) mod x and gcd(x, φ(N )) = 1. This implies gcd(x, y) = gcd(x, kφ(N )) = 1.
Thus, we have gcd(x 0 , y 0 ) = 1 as well as gcd(x 1 , y 1 ) = 1. We conclude that x 0 = x 1 and y 0 = y 1 in equation 7, which is a contradiction. Therefore e 0 = e 1 and the claim follows.
It remains to derive a lower bound for |T |. Our goal is to provide a lower bound for the size of the sets T (k). If the sets T (k) are pairwise distinct then |T | can be bounded by f k= Since gcd(x, φ(N )) = 1, we can divide both equations by φ(N ). We conclude that k = l mod x. But k, l < x by Definition 9 and therefore k = l over the integers, contradicting the assumption k = l.
In order to provide a lower bound for |T (k)|, we fix the parameters N , k and x and sum over all y in T (k). The following technical lemma from the area of analytic number theory gives us a bound for the number of integers y that meet the requirements of Definition 9. Since we want to apply the lemma for different variable settings, we give it a general form and introduce new parameters l, r and u. To understand the connection to the definition of T (k), the reader can substitute the variables l, r by the lower and upper bound −gx and gx, respectively. The variable u can be substituted by kφ(N ) in the following lemma.
Lemma 13 Let N , x ∈ AE with gcd(x, φ(N )) = 1. Let l, r, u ∈ be arbitrary.
The set {y ∈ | l < y ≤ r, y = u mod x and gcd(y, φ(N )) = 1 } contains at least 1 2 log log(φ(N ))
elements, where ǫ > 0 is arbitrary small for suitably large N .
